Effectiveness of Government Policy: An Experience from a National HealthCare System by Tetsuji Yamada et al.
NBER WORKINGPAPERSERIES
EFFECFIVENESSOFGOVERNMENT
POLICY: AN EXPERIENCE FROM A





Working Paper No. 4786




We art indebted to Professors Michael Gmssman and Bernard Okun. We also thank Kota
Hishinuma for helpful comments on this paper. The views represented here are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent those of the National Bureau of Economic Research and
affiliated universities. An earlier version of this paper was supported by the Ministry of Health
and Welfare of Japan through the International Leadership Center on Longevity and Society, and
was presented at the US-Japan Joint Conference at Mount Sinai Medical Center in NewYork in
November 1993. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Health Economics. Any




POLICY: AN EXPERIENCE FROM A
NATIONAL HEALTh CARE SYSTEM
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the trade-off between the length of treatment days and the units of
service provided per thy for elderly patients in the context of the initiative taken by the Ministry
of Health and Welfare of Japan to discourage lengthy hospital treatment and/or stay by elderly
patients. By using three leading diseases among the elderly in Japan (cancer, heart related
disease and mental illness) and separating care utilization into an episode by types of treatment,
our results suggest that the government measures function but they do not effectively work to
reduce increases in medical expenditures by the elderly under the fee-for-service basis. The
evidence shows the interdependency between days and quantity of services, and the larger impact
of services on days than days on services. Providers are more able to raise their revenue by
additional services, than by additional tieaunent days, under the government's current cost
containment policy toward the elderly cart. For the so-called skilled type of treatment services
(injection, general treatment, consultation and operation), the results on all elderly ages 65 and
over without disease classification show some statistically significant positive impact on length
of treatment in days and quantity of services provided per day. For the so-called material type
of service (medication and examination), medical service providers are likely to prescribe more
dnigs as the price of drugs falls under the current strict drug price control by the Japanese
governmenL
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At present, the United States and Japan along with most other
industrialized countries are facing an aging society. The
percentage of Japanese aged 65 and over is currently 13 percent and
is expected to reach 17 percent by the year 2000 and 25 percent by
2025. A recent increase in the aging population significantly
affects national medical care expenditures in Japan. Medical care
expenditures for the elderly have increased faster than national
medical expenditures, and the ratio of these expenditures for the
elderly to national medical care expenditures have been constantly
rising (Table 1). Elderly receiving medical care services
increased 4.0 percent per year on average since the early 1980s.
The rapid increase in medical care expenditures attracts
researchers to focus on cost containment strategies (Butler, 1991;
Garrison, 1991; Newhouse, 1993) .Traditionalcost analysis
typically focuses on the institutional sector, rather than on
episode (Custer, Moser, Musacchio and Wilike, 1990; Wedig 1993).
It suppresses information on the intensity of utilization of
service treatment within an episode. Medical service treatment
within an episode can better depict a central measure of cost than
in an institutional setting on a sector-by-sector basis. However,
an episode of treatment is often defined conceptually as a bundle
of services given during a period of continuous contact. In this
paper, by separating care utilization into episodes by typesof
treatment, we will analyze variation of treatments and information,
and deduce important policy implications. Furthermore this paper
1sheds light on the elderly's medical cost (i.e., medical
expenditures) on disease structures with various types of
treatments in the national health insurance framework, rather than
in an institutional setting at the market sector level. Thus, by
controlling for type of episode, the analysis can generate more
precise estimates of the cost structures in the aging society.
The objective of this paper is to find a relationship between
medical service provisions for the elderly and related national
policy. We will assess whether the intention of the Ministry of
Health and Welfare, by lowering the reimbursement for the medical
care, discourages lengthy hospital stays by elderly people and
constrains the quantity of services undertheNational Health
Insurance system in Japan. Thus, we will examine the trade off
between length of treatment, and quantity of services provided by
medical service providers. In addition, we will also analyze the
linkage between the change in the government reimbursement price
fortypes of services, and the so-called skilled types of services
(injection, general treatment, consultation and operation) and the
material type of services (medication and examination) under
Japanesemedical pricing system with a fee-for-service basis. The
paper analyzes three leading diseases among the elderly: cancer,
heart related diseases and mental illness.'Cancer and heart
related diseases cause the highestrate of death and
hospitalization among the elderly in Japan. Mental illness has
recently been increasing as life expectancy of elderly people rises
and has gradually increased its share of medical expenditures in
2Table 2. Medical expenditures on cancer and heart related disease
dominate, with expenditures on mental disease being third, along
with other diseases such as musculoskeletal and digestive organic
diseases for elderly age 65 and over.
The organization of the paper is as follows.Section II
presents a brief summary of the historical background of the
Japanese medical care system for the elderly. Section iii
describes the conceptual framework and methodology. The empirical
results are presented in Section IV and are followed by the
conclusion in Section V.
II Historical Background of Medical Care System for the Elderly
In 1963 the Welf are Law for the Elderly was established to
provide physical examinations for elderly people. The Medical Care
Expendituze Payment System was enacted in 1973.Its free care
system, in which copayments of the elderly were paid by the
government, resulted in too frequent medical treatment and caused
quick expansion in government expenditures on medical services for
the elderly. The average annual percentage change in medical care
expenditures was 18 percent until the Health Service System for the
Elderly was established in 1983. The previous system also created
an imbalance in the burden between the elderly who were covered by
Employees' Health Insurance and the Community Based National
Insurance. However, the previous system enabled elderly people to
have access to medical care services, and provided needed medical
care service for them.The present cost-sharing system, health
3service system, for the elderly, still presents the imbalance of
the burden shared among different health insurers. The present
system could reduce the skyrocketing increase in medical
expenditures of the elderly experienced since 1983. Currently the
elderly bear certain minimal portion of cost with the remaining
costs jointly paid by the national (20%) ,state(5%) and local (5%)
governments and the insurers of medical care insurance systems
(70%)
The insurance system for the elderly consists of five insurers
under government supervision. Government-managed Health Insurance
covers employees at place of work (mainly small and medium size
enterprises)where no social-managed Health Insuranceis
established. Social-managed Health Insurance covers employees at
places of work (mainly large enterprises and employees in
enterprises 300 and over) where Social-managed Health Insurance is
established. Seamen's Insurance covers seamen, those on defined
vessels.Mutual Aid Associations are national public service
employees, local public service employees, and private school
teachers and employees. National Insurance covers people who are
not covered by employees insurance (farmers, self-employed,
carpenters, doctors, employees of small businesses, etc.) and
retirees formerly under employees' insurance plus dependents. In
1991 about seventy percent of 15.592 million elderly belonged to
National Insurance and eighteen percent of them were general
employees under Government-managed Health Insurance. The remaining
twelve percent belonged to Social-managed Health Insurance,
4Seamen's Insurance and Mutual Aid Associations.Table 3 shows
these insurers recent share of medical care expenditures by the
elderly.
Medical service providers follow the reimbursement scheme by
the point system which is set by the Ministry of Health and Welfare
of Japan.The unified point system is applied to all medical
service providers, regardless of the types of health insurance.
The role of the point system is to generate enough revenue to cover
costs incurred. Each item of medical service is assigned a certain
number of points, and providers are reimbursed a sum of total
points multiplied by 10 yen (approximately 9 cents assuming one
dollar equals 102 yen) under the fee-for-service system.The
services consist of thirteen types of treatments: medication,
injection, examination, hospital service, general treatment,
radiology, mental treatment; anesthesia, basic consultation, home
care, image diagnosis, operation and physiotherapy.Table 4
presents the relative importance of different types of service for
the elderly in total amount of reimbursement to medical service
providers per claim. The share pattern is different for the three
types of leading diseases. There is no systematic differences in
treatment cost. Hospital services are remarkably important for
mental illness patients, followed by heart related disease and
cancer.In cancer, injection and hospital services dominate the
share. For medication, mental illness and heart related disease
have a relatively larger share than cancer. Regarding the
reimbursement for skilled type of treatment services (injection,
5general treatment, consultation and operation) ,generaltreatment
and consultation are higher for heart related disease than in the
case of cancer, while operation is higher for cancer than heart
related disease.In mental illness, skilled types of treatment
services (operation and consultation) play a smaller role than
general treatment.
Japanese reimbursement price is based on the point system
which is classified into thirteen service categories: medication,
injection, examination, hospital service, general treatment,
radiology, mental treatment, anesthesia, basic consultation, home
care, image diagnosis, operation and physiotherapy.In these
groups there are further classificatipns. For example an initial
consultation is 195 points (1 point=10 yen) and 450 points with
referrals; nursing at hospital is 318 points; injection ranges from
15 to 150. points, depending on skill required; medication is 1
point per 15 yen purchasing material price plus prescription which
is 74 points per unit. These changes in points are dependent on
whether the patients are children, adult or elderly, degree of
skill required, quantity of material and patient's length of
treatment. The government reimbursement price consists of these
complicated pricing classifications on a fee-for-service basis.
Abe (1983) intensively analyzes the Japanese point system and
discusses a lack of strict internal control by medical service
providers who create a failure to perform efficiently.In this
study we use a price of each type of service in thirteen
classifications of types of services.
6III Analytical Framework
For utilization of treatments, medical service providers have
dual roles.They act as if they were not only the patient's
advisors but also as income optimizers for their own interest. In
the latter role, suppose that medical service providers have an
incentive for optimizing their target revenue under a fee-f or-
service basis in a national health insurance system.2If they
target a certain revenue, there exists a trade off between a length
of treatment in days and quantity of services per day within a
given target revenue, and they reveal characteristics of treatment
within an episode. We note that service utilization not only rises
rapidly near the terminal period but also the last days of
physician and hospital services have less resource utilization than
the first days. It is plausible that a fall in the average length
of treatments by the government containment policy may increase the
resource intensity per day under the fee-for-service basis. A rise
in the amount of reimbursement per day, namely medical care
expenditures, depends on the average utilization of services per
day and the last day's marginal change in the resource intensity.
Thus, we will examine this trade off between treatment days and
quantity of services provided and look at different treatments for
cancer, heart related disease and mental illness for the elderly.
We evaluate how the government reimbursement price affects the
length of treatment for a disease and quantity of services provided
by hospitals for the elderly, especially the difference between
skilled and material services.
7A disease requires different types of treatment services
within an episode. A cost of each treatment service is reimbursed
by the government.In this section we try to conceptualizea
relationship between a reimbursement price by the government and
medical service providers in a generalized framework.3Suppose
that a reimbursement price by the government to medicalcare
service providers:Pr, is expressed as,
= l'mS+ 0c s <1,
where m denotes a market price under the competitive marketamong
the health and medical service providers, "s" stands fora subsidy
rate by the government, Pms is government subsidy through medical
service providers. The government subsidy with a fee-for-service
system tends to induce medical service providers to provide more
medical services to patients and create induced demand for medical
service:Q, not quantity demanded (Feldstein, 1993).Achoice of
medical service is determined by providers, notpatients.
Providers will be guided by their efficiency and treatmentprices
which affect their revenue. Under theexisting national health
care system, current demand curve for health and medical services
already stays on the right side of a demand curve, D,compared to
D0 which is without government involvement in Figure 1.Thus, a
one unit increase in demand for health and medical serviceresults.
in an increase in a price whichdepends on the slope of supply
curve. Each percentage increase in Q that raises the marketprice
of medical service, resulting ina net change in price due to a one
unit increase in medical care isexpressed as
82 =1/Q•Pm1/E.
An absolute rise in the price (ÔP,/aQ) is equal to a medical price
per service multiplied by 1/c which is an inverse of an elasticity
of supply of medical service. Then, the total price is expressed
as, OP/ÔQ + m• Japan's point system is itemized pricing with fee-
for-service and providers may be encouraged or may generate revenue
to cover the total cost. It provides more individualized care and
requires different resources for treatment. Thus, the intention of
the government's point system is to encourage efficient use of
medical resources and it depends on the optimal size of government
subsidy which in turn influences revenue of medical service
providers. Anequilibriumsubsidy rate, given a supply of medical
service curve, is derived from equations 1 and 2. We obtain
3 s = (OPm/ÔQ) (1/Pm)
where the subsidy rate is a rate of change in 2m with respect to Q.
The subsidy rate:s, is e1e3/e3Q1with the government subsidy of
national health care system in Figure 1.A demand curve D0
represents the original demand curve without the national health
care system, while D' is the current demand curve with the national
health care system. The equilibrium point moves from e to e1. The
population currently enjoys a higher level of consumption of
medical services at 01.The national health care system provides
comprehensive health and medical services for the population. It
improves health status of people, and in turn extends the amount of
time of available to people for daily activities because a decrease
in the number of sick days will increase the time available for
9socio-economic activities such as work, leisure and others. Thus,
the system raises the economic value of human resources and
permeates benefits to others through a provision of health and
medical services in the society (Grossman 1972a and 197Th)
Therefore, the external benefits to others in the society emerges.
This quasi-society's benefit is expressed by marginal social
benefitcurve:NSA,whichismarginalsocialbenefits
(MSB=OPm/OQ=Pms) in Figure 1.
A governmentsubsidy largely depends on a slope of supply of
medical services curve.The current supply curve, namely a
marginal cost curve, depends on and is determined by efficient use
of medical input resources. Given the government reimbursement
price, suppose that a medical service provider has a target at a
certain revenue. Let's consider a representative medical service
provider whose preferences are generated by the utility function
(Wedig, 1993), as
4 U =11(R), U'> 0 and U"c 0.
U is the utility derived from a medical service revenue,R. Revenue
is an additively separable revenue function and is defined as
S RrQ(QisQa),
whereQ and Q9 are a length of treatment and quantity of services
provided, respectively. This separation is theoretically proved by
Coyte (1985) ,andhe explicitly discusses medical service providers
as utility maximizers. For a dual role assumption, providers act
according to a patient's financial and medical interests as
decision makers, and also act as their own utility maximizers who
10target an optimization of total revenue. A provider's Optimized
revenue is obtained by differentiating the total revenue with
respect to both types of care provided, and we obtain as,
6 MR =AR1[1 + +ARS( 1 +(l/c)],MR￿O
where MR is a marginal revenue, AR is an average revenue of a
length of stay:1, and of a quantity of service:s, andisa
government reimbursement price elasticity of a length of stay:e1,
and of a quantity of service:c. Japan's point system, i.e. the
government reimbursement price, has an important role for the
medical service providers and influences on quantitative decision
of medical services. Especially the fee-for-service system induces
the providers to perform a dual role. We will analyze the role of
the government reimbursement price and its influence on the medical
service providers with Japan's point system under the national
health insurance framework.
Let's suppose T is a target-evenue margin per unit as mark-
ups over cost.It is expressed as follows
7 T = - MC)/Prv
where MC is the marginal cost of medical service provided, and r
is the government reimbursement price. A smaller gap between P,
and MC represent a more competitive market (Hoerger, 1990)
Therefore T tends to be small. Under an optimal condition from
equations 6 and 7, we obtain as,
B P, =AR1{[1+ (i/c) I /(1-TI}+ AR9{(1+ (1/c,.) 1/(1-TI }, and
9 MSB =3P/OQAR1{ [l+(l/cp1))/11TI)+AR{(l+(l/cp0)]/1lTI }-.
Thederivation of above approach is in conformity with the
11theoretical framework of optimization (Pauly, 1987)Equation 9
presents the following interesting implications in a provision of
medical service under the current national health care system.
Given an equilibrium quantity of medical services,
(1) An inelastic Ep and/or 6flQsmeanslarge 1/c s-Q at the
equilibrium level of medical service.It implies that a large
subsidy relative to a market price (namely a subsidy rate: s) will
be required with an inelastic steep curve. It is shown by e1e3/e301
with a relatively steep marginal curve: MC in Figure 1. Hence a
medical service provider targets a high level of T because of an
increase in the level of rwithgiven level of mandquantity of
medical service. An inelastic MC" requires the government to spend
a relatively large amount of subsidy: e1e3, to maintain national
medical services at Q level, while an elastic marginal cost curve:
MC,requires a lower amount of the government subsidy: e2e3 in
Figure1. Put differently, the government reimbursement price is
proportionallyhigher than the market price which does not involve
the government in provisions for medical care services.Thus
efficiency in producing medical service by providers is important
to achieving cost containment policy.
(2) A more elastic MC of medical service in Figure 1, is implied
asmall 1/c =sQat the equilibrium levelof medical service. A
small subsidy rate: s, induces medical service providers to target
alow rate of T because of a little change in r•Inthis case the
reimbursement price is small proportionally and relatively to a
market price, in turn the government spending on health and medical
12service declines.
(3) A situation of a small gap between T and rmayforce to
medical service providers to lower marginal cost:MC, namely more
efficient production of medical service.
we have discussed the implication ofthe government
reimbursement price on behavior of targeting revenue by medical
service providers. Our concern is that the objective of medical
service providers as optimizers is to target a certain level of
total revenue under the fee-for-service system.In this case a
change in the government reimbursement price affects medical
service providers who control quantity of medical care services
such as a length of treatment in days and/or number at units of
service per day. Art assumption of our target revenue hypothesis is
that medical service providers maintain their actual total revenue.
The following equations derived from equation 8 allows us to
analyze precisely how different service treatment affects length of




where Z1 is (1+ (l/E1)I/[1-TI,Z,is (1+ (l/e)) /(1-TI.
andO'. are an inversed proportion of a government reimbursement
price to revenuefrom length of stay and to revenue from services
respectively,and 4,isa ratio of revenue from length of stays to
services.Equations lOs show that 01and 0area function of both
alength of treatment and a quantity of services, and the
governmentreimbursement price,and Q1and Q are also
13simultaneously determined.
To understand the relationship between medical service
provision for the elderly and the governments point of view of
health care needs among different treatments within an episode, we
will investigate the impacts of reimbursement price of various
treatment services on length of treatment in days and number of
units of service, and examine these relationships regarding an
existence of trade off between treatment in days and quantity of
services provided per day within an episode.The length of
treatment in days and number of units of service treated per day
employed within the context of this paper are estimated as,
(A) DAYf(SERVICE, PRICE) +
and
(B) SERVICE =IWAY, PRICE) +to2,
whereDAY is length of treatment in days for treatment, SERVICE is
number of units of service provided per day, and PRICE which is
prices of various treatment received by medical serviôe providers
through the health care system represents a unit price for a type
of service.The toin(A) and (3) are stochastic error terms,
because there are components of length of treatment in days for
treatment and number of units of service per day that are affected
by unmeasured factors. To test interdependency between a length of
treatment days and quantity of services per day we employ a system
of simultaneous equations by a two-stage-least-squares estimation
procedure.
14IV Empirical results
The data used to estimate the models A and B is based on the
Shakai Jryo Shiryo Koibetsu Chosa Houkoku 1989-1991 which is based
on aggregated monthly financial report in June for each year and is
compiled by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. This aggregate
data contains thirteen disease classifications, for which we choose
the three leading types of diseases (48 observations for cancer, 54
for heart related disease and 48 for mental illness) and all
elderly people without disease classification (120 observations)
The data contains thirteen types of treatment services with number
of claims, services and the amount of government reimbursement.
The data does not classify male and female difference regarding
length of treatment in days and units of service provided. We
integrate two important health insurances (Government-managed
Health Insurance and National Insurance) and age classification of
65-69 and 70- into the estimation of all elderly people without
disease classification. But we are not able to integrate these
variables for the estimation of each disease (cancer, heart relate
disease and mental illness) because of inadequate data regarding
disease classification among the elderly in this publicly open
data. Thus, the study on all elderly people examines the effect of
the National Insurance and the Government-managed Health Insurance
on medical service providers' behavior for the care of elderly by
using a dummy variable along with an age dummy variable without
disease classification.The data does not contain information
about providers' and patients' characteristics. Thus, we await the
15availability of micro-level data to the public to get further
insight.
Table S presents the definition of variables.Means and
standard deviation are reported in Tables 6 (three leading diseases
among the elderly) and 7 (all elderly people aged 65 and over
without disease classification) .Tables8 (three leading diseases
among the elderly) and 9 (all elderly people aged 65 and over
without disease classification) present the result of estimated
effects of reimbursement prices on number of days of treatment and
units service per day. We employ various government reimbursement
prices as exogenous variables with controlling quantity measures:
an amount of services and length of treatment in days. Regarding
medical-service quality control as Fahs (1985) discusses medical
services by physicians, this study has difficulty in controlling
for quality measures because of the characteristics of data. The
use of conditional indexes for the detection of multicollinearity
is required. The results of conditional indexes are less than 5.5
and variance of inflation factors are less than 4. We conclude
that there exists no harmful multicollinearity problem. The
equation for cancer (Table 8) is overidentified. The equations for
heart related disease (Table 8), mental illness (Table 8) and all
elderly people (Table 9) are identified. And, we examined the rank
and order of conditions for all of them. The conditions of all
four equations are satisfied.As an appropriate estimation
procedure we employ two-stage least squares, and Tables 8 and 9
report estimation results as elasticity term5.
16The coefficients of primary interest (treatment days and
services) are statistically significant for cancer, heart related
disease and mental illness, and all of them are negative in Table
8. The results seem to be consistent with our prior hypothesis,
i.e. inverse relationship between services and treatment days. In
cancer a 1 percent increase in services will lead to a 1.515
percent decrease in days, while a 1 percent increase in treatment
days will lead to a 0.426 percent decrease in services per day.
For cancer treatment, the marginal impact of units of service per
day on treatment in days is a net change of 17,150 yen ($168.14)
for medical service providers and the marginal impact of treatment
days on services per day is 3,634 yen ($35.63) ..'Put differently,
the providers gain more revenue by increasing units of services,
rather than by increasing treatment days for patients. Because the
impactof services is greater than the impact of induced change in
a treatment day. If the providers increase per day treatment, they
loserevenue, and vice versa.Again the impact of per day
treatment is smaller than the impact of induced change in per day
services.Under the fee-for-service system the medical service
providers are easily able to raise quantity of services to treat
elderly patients. However, the objective of the Ministry of Health.
of Welf are which is to discourage a lengthy stay of an elderly
patient by lowering reimbursement price is functioning.This
causes the providers to loose their revenue by the lower
reimbursement price, when the length of treatment in days for the
elderly patients rises regardless of a change in controlled days or
17of an induced day change. But the results show that the medical
providers would not lose by increasing additional services because
positive net gain is about 13,516 (17,150-3,634) yen per day, when
the quantity of services rises regardless of a change in controlled
services or of an induced services change.For the Ministry of
Health and Welfare to rein lengthy hospital stays by the elderly
patients, this empirical study finds thattheshorter the hospital
stay of an elderly patient, the larger the amount of additional
services. Our results show that the government objective
effectively functions. However the medical expenditures by the
government for the elderly patients do not decline under the fee-
for-service system in the national health insurance framework. In
addition the quantity of services is a larger influence on cost
saving than on treatment days from the view of the government.
In cc,mparison to cancer, in the case of heart related disease,
the estimated coefficient of treatment days is less elastic while
that of services is more elastic. A 1 percent increase in services
will tend to lower treatment days by a 0.9776 percent, and a 1
percent increase in the days will lower quantity of services by a
0.5375 percent. It is also notable that the impact of services on
treatment days contributes 17,047 yen ($167.13) which is very
similar to the amount in the case of cancer, while impact of days
on services contributes only 7,516 yen ($73.69) which is however
twice as large in the cancer case. tincreasein services for
heart related disease will again raise medical cost, by a large
amount, namely, expenditures of the government (directly) ,and
18consumers (indirectly through taxation) .Thisis because in spite
of the inverse relationship between days and services, an increase
in the amount of government reimbursement by the medical providers
raising the amount of services dominates the amount of the
government reimbursement caused by a decline in treatment days for
elderly patients. For mental illness, although the gain is small
amount of 833 yen ($8.17), the result of mental illness also leads
the similar conclusion.
In Table 9 the results of negative sign presents the inverse
relationship between treatment days and amount of services provided
per day for all elderly patients. The effect of services on days
has a larger impact than that of days on services. Under the fee-
for-service system in the national health insurance, medical
service providers may easily raise their revenue through additional
services, not by additional treatment days. Our results provide
evidence for this important result, however further careful
empirical testing is necessary to generalize the inverse
relationship,namely trade off, between treatment days and quantity
of services provided, and to measure the initiative taken by the
Ministry....of Health and Welfare of Japan regarding the lengthy
hospital stays by the elderly patients.
Tuning attention to the effect of government reimbursement
price on treatment days and services, we do not examine all
thirteen types of treatments in the same manner for three types of
diseases because physiotherapy is close to zero and less important
for cancer but not for heart related disease as Table 4 shows.
19Mental treatment is almost zero share for the heart related
disease.The radiology services are almost zero for the heart
related disease and mental illness in our data sources.In both
cancer and heart related disease our interesting finding from the
results in Table 8 is that material types of service treatments,
such as R.medication and R.examination, show negative signs and are
statistically significant while skilled type service treatments,
such as R.consultation, R.operation, R.injection, R.physiotherapy
and R.treatment(general), are positively and statistically
significant except R.treatment variable for cancer.
In cancer and heart related disease in Table S material types
of R.medication and R.examination are negative. It is interesting
to note that the negative signs for R.medication and R.examination
are not congruent with alleged statement of excessive drugs and
diagnostic, examinations by the Japanese medical service providers.
For example a 1 percent increase in R.medication will lower a
0.1787 percent for cancer days and a 0.4443 percent of days for
heart related disease. In R.examination a 1 percent increase in
the government reimbursement price will lower 0.168 percent days
for cancer and 0.3819 percent days for heart related disease.
Unlike cancer and heart related disease the results of mental
illness show that R.medication as material type of service
treatment tends to have lengthy hospital stays and additional
service treatments. This seems to reflect the characteristics of
the illness. A 1 percent rise in R.medication will increase a
0.3975 percent of days and a 0.2449 percent of services for mental
20illness patients.These results are different from cancer and
heart related disease. The results of R.rnental (mental treatment)
and R.consultation (skilled type of service) indicate the negative
relationship between reimbursement price, and treatment days and
services.A change in government reimbursement price does not
reveal a systematic effect of skilled and material types of
services on the length of treatment and quantity of services
provided per day.However distinction seems to exist between
cancer and heart related disease, and mental illness.Another
note-worthy finding is that the estimated coefficients in Table 9
indicate that skilled types of services (injection, general
treatment, consultation and operation) tend to show statistically
significant positive sign. Andagainthe coefficient of
R.medication shows the negative sign.From this result we may
deduce tha,t the current strict drug price control by the government
induces the medical service providers to prescribe more drugs for
elderly patients as the price declines (Newhouse, 1993).
Most of the estimated elasticities of the government
reimbursement price are inelastic except R.radiology for cancer and
R.hospital for days of heart related disease. Put differently,
length of treatments and quantity of services provided per day are
insensitive to the government reimbursement price regardless of
qualitative signs.As for positive case, an increase in the
government reimbursement price will present incentive to medical
service providers to induce more specific types of service
treatment, say physiotherapy, to the elderly patients of heart
21related disease. A large increase in the government reimbursement
price will be required to increase the treatment of physiotherapy
to cover needs for elderly patients. As for negative case, a large
decrease in the government reimbursement price has a small impact
on a change in quantity, and the government is able to reduce a
large amount of health and medical care expenditure on material
type of service treatments, such as medication and diagnostic
examination, by reducing the government reimbursement price.
The National Insurance and the Government-managed Health
Insurance cover about 88% of the elderly people under the National
Health Insurance System.The result of Insurance.D in Table 9
indicates the medical service providers treat the patient of
National Insurance with fewer treatment days (about 1.1 days at the
sample mean) and quantity of services per day (about 1.4 units at
the sample mean) compared to those of the Government-managed Health
Insurance. It is alleged that people under the community based
National Insurance, i.e. farmers, self-employed and employees of
small business, are inferior in health status than those of the
employee based Government-managed Health Insurance. If it is true,
our result is not congruent with adduced statement. Because the
length of treatment and quantity of services are provided more to
the Government-managed Health Insurance patients. Further careful
empirical study is necessary to test the allegation. The positive
Age.D in Table 9 suggests that longer treatment days is attributed
to an increase in age. The elderly age 70 and over are treated
about one day longer than the elderly age 65-69 at the sample mean.
22Regarding the effect on quantity of service provided per day, it is
positive but weak.
We are interested in the costs of these three types of leading
diseases in Japan and we have a proximity of loss of economic
indirect cost (loss of own earning) and direct health and medical
cost by the elderly age 65 and over in 1991.'In cancer for a
month, economic indirect costs are about 5.59 billion yen ($54.8
million: $l=lO2yen) ,andhealth and medical costs are about 68.201
billion yen ($668.6 million) .Inheart related disease for a
month, economic indirect costs are 30.86 billion yen ($302.5
million), and health and medical costs are 257.497 billion yen
($2.524 billion) .Inmental illness for a month, economic indirect
costs are 0.46 billion yen ($4.5 million), and health and medical
costs are 26.43 billion yen ($259 million) .Wenote that summing
these figures still underestimates total loss of costs caused by
three leading diseases of the elderly age 65 and over. For
comparison purpose, we tentatively calculate and compare it with
the gross national product in 1991.The total cost of three
leading diseases: 4,668.456 billion yen ($45.77 billion), is about
0.3 percent of the gross national product in 1991.
V. Conclusion
This paper examines the trade off between the length of
treatment in days and units of service provided per day for
elderly patients in the context of the initiative taken bythe
Ministry of Health and Welfare of Japan to discourage lengthy
23hospital treatment and/or stay by the elderly patients.By
separating disease care utilization into an episode by types of
treatment, our results suggest that the government measures
function but it does not effectively work to reduce increasing
medical expenditures by the elderly under the fee-for-service basis
in the National Health Care system.The evidence of the three
leading diseases (cancer, heart related disease and mental illness)
by the elderly shows the interdependency between days and quantity
of services and the larger impact of services on days than days on
services. The medical service providers are easily able to raise
their revenue by additional services, not by additional treatment
days, under the government current cost containment policy toward
the elderly care.
The skilled type of treatment services (injection, general
treatment,consultation and operation) do not show clear
distinction among types of disease as prices of service change.
However, the results from all elderly age 65 and over without
disease classification show some statistically significant positive
impact by skilled types of service treatments on length of
treatment in days and quantity of services provided per day. The
material type of treatment service (medication and examination)
have a negative effect on the length of treatment in days and
quantity of services in cancer and heart related disease, but
positive effect in mental illness. we find that our results are
not congruent with alleged excessive drug and diagnostic
examination by the medical service providers. However, they are
24likely to prescribe more drugs as the price of drugs fall under the
current strict drug price control by the Japanese government. Our
result also indicates that the elderly patients under the community
based National Insurance receive shorter length of treatment in
days and quantity of services per day than the patients under the
employee based Government-managed Health Insurance. These results
suggest further careful study to assess the government measures,
i.e. the objective by the Ministry of Health and Welfare to reduce
the lengthy hospital treatment and/or stay by the elderly patients.
It is interesting to note that length of treatment in days
and units service per day are not very responsive to changes in the
government reimbursement prices. The results indicate that large
health care expenditures are generally required to expand each type
of treatment to promote health status for the elderly in Japan.
These leading diseases by the elderly: cancer, heart related
disease and mental illness, cost about 0.3 percent of the GNP in
1991 although the figure is proximity of loss of indirect- and
direct costs by the elderly age 65 and over.
25FOOTNOTES
1.In this paper heart related disease means ischemic heart
disease, hypertensive disease and cerebrovascular disease within
the circulatory system.
2.The meaning of target revenue by medical providers in this
study is different from "target income hypothesis of physician
pricing" which suggests that with an increase in the number of
physicians, physicians will increase both their prices and their
demand to provide themselves with a target income. Note there are
three other types of hypotheses of hospital behavior which are
different from our context: (1) a profit maximizing model which
assumes that a nonprofit hospital acts as though it were a for-
prof it hospital but returns its profit to the community; (2) a
utility maximizing model assumes that hospitals act as if they
wanted to maximize their output or revenue, and they invest either
in additional capacity, cost-saving technology or facilities in
order to increase output or revenue; (3) a physician-control model
assumes that physicians are the beneficiaries of nonprofit
hospitals and the model suggests that with increased demand for
medical services in the community, physicians would favor an
increase in their hospitals' capacity so as to increase their
productivity which in turn increases their incomes.
3.The results obtained by Coyte (1985) do not differ from a
distinction made between hospital managers (entrepreneurs) and the
specialists (i.e. physicians) employed. In Japan physicians are
heavily involved in decision making in hospitals. In this study
medical services providers mean both physicians and hospitals.
4.The revenue function is an additively separable function.
There exists substitution between the length of treatment and
quantity service provided, and the revenue from both cares are
additive.Instead of factoring out P as usual procedure, P is
26multiplied by 0/0 in order to obtain AR.
S.Kmenta (1986) and Green (1993) intensively discuss the
conditional requirements to perform the simultaneous equations. The
model of equations should be identified. In the model of
simultaneous equation in this study,the order condition of
identifiability and the rank condition were examined. And both
conditions are satisfied. The instrumental variables which we use
are variables of reimbursement prices, total claims per month,
total government reimbursement of medication, operation, hospital,
imagediagnosis,homeservices, examination, treatment,
physiotherapy, anesthesia and mental special treatment.
6. The calculation is based on Tables 8 and 10 as,
a) an impact of services on treatment days =(coefficientof
services(=elasticity) x (mean of day/mean of services) x amount of
per day government reimbursement] -(amountof the government
reimbursement per unit x mean of per day units services)
b) an impact of treatment days on services =(coefficientof days
(=elasticity) x (mean of services/mean of days) x amount of the
government reimbursement per unitxmean of per day units
services] -amountof per day government reimbursement.
We use an exchange rate $l=l02 yenin this paper. Readers are
required to be cautious of interpretation because we do not use
"purchasing power parity" for this simple estimation.
7. Because of data availability we have not estimated the loss of
complete direct and indirect costs, such as care giver's market
opportunity costs, patients' waiting time, and expenditures of
elderly in nursing homes which are in the very early stages in
Japan. Waiting time costs by patients,especially in Japan, is an
important factor in ascessing loss of human time (Yarnada and
Yamada, 1993), and Feldstein (1998) intensively discuss time costs
for traveling to a provider and for waiting for treatment. The
calculation is based on average labor force participation for men
27and women age 65 and over considering full- and part-time workers,
and average monthly salary for men and women is based on the
assumption that they are full-time workers and these cancer, heart
related disease and mental illness patients are healthy.The
sources come from Kokumin Iryohi (National Medical Expenditure in
English), Department of Statistics and Information, Minister's
Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1993; Shakai Iryc
Shiryo Koibetsu Chosa Houkoku, Vol.1 and 2, Department of
Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of
Health and welfare, 1991 and 1993. Rodo Hakusho of 1991 (white
Paper of Labor), The Department of Labor; Kokumin Fukushi no Doko
(The Trend of National Welfare in English), 1993, The Health and
welfare Statistics Association;Kanja Chosa of 1990 (patients
Survey), Department of Statistics and Information, Minister's
Secretariat, Ministry of Health and Welfare; and Kokumin Iryohi
(National Health and Medical Expenditures in English), Department
of Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of
Health and welfare, 1993.
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30TABLE 1
Trends in Medical Care Expenditures




yen % changeyen % change l000(yen) % change
(A) (B)
198617,069.0 6.6 4,437.7 9.1 523 4.9 26.0
198718,075.9 5.9 4,830.9 8.9 549 4.9 26.7
198818,755.4 3.8 5,159.3 6.8 568 3.5 27.5
198919,729.0 5.2 5,557.8 7.7 594 4.5 28.2
199020,607.44.5 5,926.96.6 609 2.6 28.8
199121,826.0 5.9 6,409.5 8.1 634 4.1 29.4
Sources: Hoken to Nenkin no Doko, HealthandWelfare Statistics Association,
Vol.40, Tokyo, 1993; Shakai Hosho Tokei Nenpo 1991, Sorifu Shakai Hoshoseido
Shingikai Jimukyoku, Tokyo, 1993; Outline of Social Insurance in Japan, Social
Insurance Agency, Tokyo, 1993.
TABLE2
ExpenditureShare of Three Leading Disease in total Expenditures of Age 65 and
over
Year Expenditures share
age 65 & over cancerheart mental
related disease
1986 3,315.2 billion yen 12.9 % 38.2 % 5.8%
1987 3,544.7 13.4 38.7 6.0
1988 3,676.6 13.5 36.8 6.2
1989 3,897.2 13.8 38.0 6.4
1990 4,126.0 15.0 39.6 6.1
1991 4,272.4 14.0 38.9 6.3
Sources:Kokumin Iryohi (National Medical Expenditure in English), Department of
Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Health and
welfare,1993;Shakai Iryo Shiryo KoibetsuChosa Houkoku, Vol.1 and 2,
Department of Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of
Health and welfare, 1991 and 1993.
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State 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.9
Local 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9
Insurer §L2 67.6 67.7 67.7 67.767.5
GMHI 15.2 17.8 18.1 18.7 19.920.2
stmr 11.8 15.3 15.6 15.7 17.017.0
SEA 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
MAA 5.4 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.5 6.4
NI 36.1 27.7 27.4 26.8 24.223.8
Patients ..L1..2J...L.i ..LA ...L2
Q: GIRl stands for Government-managed Health Insurance, SMHI stands for
Social-managedHealth Insurance, SEAstands for Semen's Insurance, MAA stands for
Mutual Aid Associations, andNIstands for National Insurance.
Sources: floken to Nenkin no Doko, Health andWelfareStatistics Association,
Vol.40, Tokyo, 1993; Shakai Hosho Tokei Nenpo 1991, Sorifu Shakai Hoshoseido
Shingikai Jimukyoku, Tokyo. 199); Outline of Social Insurance in Japan, Social
Insurance Agency,Tokyo, 1993.
TABLE 4
Elderly'sExpenditures for the Share by Types of Services provided














Medication 9.4 % 10.9 % 11.1 %
Injection 20.6 11.6 4.6
Examination 9.5 '7.6 3.7
Hospital day 41.2 56.4 67.0
General treatment 2.9 4.1 2.4
Mental treatment 0.2 0.0 1.6
Consultation 1.4 1.6 0.9
Home care 0.2 0.2 0.2
Image diagnosis 7.8 2,9 7.8
Operation 4.6 2.1 0.1







Qt: Radiology and anesthesia are included in "Other" in this statistics.
Sources: Shakai Iryo Shiryo Koibetsu Chosa Houkoku 1991, Vol.1 and 2. Department
of Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of Health
and Welfare.
32TABLE 5 Definition of Variables (types of services provided)
Days
A number of hospital treatment days per claims by a monthly financial statements.
service
A number of units service per day.
R .medication
Reimbursement price of medication (yen)It includes internal medicine, dose of
medicine, eternal medicine, preparation, and others.
P. injection
Reimbursement price of injection (yen) .Itincludes fee for injection skill,
medicine, materials, and others.
P. examination
Reimbursement price of examination (yen) .Itincludes physical test, excrement
test, blood test, biochemistry test, inmiunity test, somatic test, supersonic-wave
test, ophthalmology exam, endoscopy, and others.
R.hospital(day)
Reimbursement price ofhospital day(yen) .Itincludes room, standard bed and
bedclothes,nurse, seriousillness, food,specialmanagement, and others.
P. treatment (general)
Reimbursement price of general treatment (yen) .Itincludes general treatment,
first aid treatment, dermatology, bladder treatment, uterus treatment,
ophthalmologytreatment,otolaryngology treatment, andother.
P. radiology
Reimbursementprice of radiology (yen). It includes external and internal X-ray,
andothers.
R .mental
Reimbursement price of mental treatment (yen) .Itincludes standard mental
analysis,counseling, group therapy, night care and specialdementia treatment.
P. anesthesia
Reimbursement price of anesthesia (yen) .Itincludes vein, spinal cord, nervous
system, and others.
P. consultation
Reimbursement price of consultation (yen) .Itincludes first visit, revisit,
medical management of chronic disease, medical management for elderly outpatient.
guidance, and others.
R.home care
Reimbursement price of home care (yen) .Itincludes medical examination and
treatment of home care, medical guidance and nurse for bedridden elderly, medical
treatment and guidance at home, and others.
33TABLE S (continued)
R image
Reimbursement price of image diagnosis (yen) .Itincludes X-rayed diagnosis,
special photographing, endoradiography photographing, computer tomogram,
diagnosis of nucleus medical science, and others.
R. operation
Reimbursement price of operation (yen) .Itincludes skin transplantation,
muscle, nervous system, operation related to ophthalmology, operation related to
otolaryngology, breast, chest, heart, stomach, and others.
R.physiotherapy
Reimbursement price of physiotherapy (yen). It includes phototherapy,
actinotherapy, exercise therapy, electric therapy, speech therapy, special
treatment for mental illness, and others.
Additional Definition of Variables for the Regression of the Elderly aged 65 and
overwithout Illness Classification in Table 9
R.other
Reimbursementprice of unclassified other medical services Cyen)
Insurance. D
This is a duniznyvariabletaking the value 0 for the Government-managed Health
Insurance and 1 for the National Health Insurance.
Age.D
This is a dummyvariabletaking the value 0 for aged65-69and 1 for 70 and over.
Year.D
Thisis the dummy variable taking the value 0 for 1989 and 1 for 1990.
34TABLE 6 Means and Standard Deviations
Three Leading disease among the Elderly (types of services provided)
(Cancer) (Hart related (Mental)
disease)
Means STD Means Sit Means sit
nays 11.054 8.751 13.166 10.302 25.948 54.923
Services 16.200 9.176 15.220 8.349 13.813 9.988
R.medication 369.829 ,204.897213.172 49.345 205.580 68.331
R.injection 3183.066 1906.896 2071.454 1688.130 1412.031 817.274
R.examination1057.466216.753 1029.911 272.608 996.605 467.112
R.hospital 8766.978606.686 7482.867 705.792 6481.897 366.222
(day)
R.treatment 1026.213858.393651.279 336.629 590.664 262.951
(general)
R.radiology 6327.170499.048 - - - -
R.mental 1937.284 1655.428 1864.230 1031.630 1674.047 849.350
R.anesthesia17228.133 23085.464 11284.948 23330.654 2375.71911360.245
R.consultation 2489.464 1550.551 1851.387 934.337 1685.254 926.854
R.home care 16784.957 14059.880 8850.228 13000.875 5966.409 3245.110
R.image 2611.760 1456.625 2150.908 1429.790 2331.425 2191.047
R.operation 38901.746 79057.808 36796.437 45834.239 241151.728 1094730.332
R.physiotherapy 1077.120606.979 1080.397 390.066 918.650 355.339
Observation 48 for cancer 54 for heart 48 for mental
relateddisease
R.radiologyis a reimbursement price of radiology treatment, We dropped
it from a mean calculation for heart related disease andmentalillness because
of inadequate observations.
35TABLE 7Meansand Standard Deviations






















Three Leading Disease among the Elderly (types of services provided)
Cancer Heart related diseaseMental
Days Services Days Services Days Services
Services -l.Sl4Sa -O.9776a -l.3024a
(-9.94) (-4.26) (-10.68)
Days -0.4258a -0.S357a -O.7l33a
(-4.99) (-5.18) (-10.43)
R.medication -O.1787b -0.0561 -0.4443b -0.2l27c 0.3975a 0.2449b
(—2.09) (-1.10) (—2.56) (-1.81) (3.52) (2.70)
R.injection -0.0383 0.0053 0.195Gb 0.0105 0.0790 -0.0364
(—0.85) (0.20) (2.18) (0.17) (0.45)(-0.27)
R.examination-0.1680b -0.1021b-0.3819c 0.0752 0.17420.0943
(—2.53) (-2.72) (—1.71) (0.51) (0.79) (0.55)
R.hospital 0.5766 0.6938c-1.379b -0.3833 0.48370.5672
(day) (0.94) (1.77) (-2.60) (-1.02) (0.40) (0.57)
R.treatiuent -0.111Gb -0.0942a O.1992a 0.0875b -0.00570.0505
(general) (-2.64) (-4.10) (3.29) (2.03) (-0.09) (0.63)
R.radiology -2.969a-1.5153b - - - -
(—3.02) (—2.61)
R.mental -0.1720b -0.0777c - - -0.7555a-0.5784b
(—2. 53) (—2.00) (-2.79)(—2.19)
R.anesthesia -0.0271-0.0235 - - - -
(-1.06) (—1.68)
R.consultation - -0.0961 0.7279a -0.0168 -0.5419c -0.3844c
(—0.71) (3.25) (—0.09) (—2. 01)(—1.85)
R.hoine care 0.2202a — -0.1167c - -0.2365—0.2640
(2.79) (-2.00) (—1.32)(-1.35)
R.image - -0.0834c - -0.0220 -0.02210.0105
(-1.69) (-0.37) (-0.20)(0.11)
R.operation 0.0767c- 0.0340 -0.0169 -0.0614c-
(1.71) (0.91) (-0.75) (-1.70)
R.physiotherapy- - 0.240Th 0.1509b - -0.2153
(2.13) (2.11) (-0.67)
Constant 28.577a14.182b12.883b 6.532b 9.4287.537
(2.92) (2.44) (2.63) (2.03) (0.87)(0.95)
a2 0.950 0.94 0.96 0.95 0.93 0.91
F statistics8l.57a65.17a143.34a 112.03a 56.31a41.70a
t-statistics are in parentheses.
a,liand c are statistically significant at the it, 5%and10% level,
respectively.
37TABLE 9Estimated Coefficients




R.,nedication -0.2450 (-1.05) -0.5124a (-5.77)
R.injection 0.168Th (2.36) -0.0164 1-0.36)
R.examination 0.5231b (2.36) 0.4338a (3.99)
R.hospital -0.7406c (-1.91) 0.0559 (0.23)
(day)
R.treatment 0.1158b (2.10) 0.1050a (4.05)
(general)
R.radiology 0.1346c (1.66) 0.0934b (2.09)
R.mental 0.0280 (0.33) -0.0274 (-0.59)
R.anesthesia -0.0009 (-0.04) 0.0015 (0.12)
R.consultation -0.3083 (-0.95) 0.3203c (1.67)
a.home care -0.1853 (-1.31) -
R.image 0.0338 (0.42) 0.0908c (1.78)
R.operation 0.0660 (1.25) 0.0969a (3.66)
R.physiotherapy -0.3161b (-2.21) -0.2236a (-3.13)
R.other — 0.0849 (0.12)
Insurance.D -0.2264b (-2.11) -0.1129c (-1.83)
Age.D 0.1961a (2.68) 0.0696 (1.55)
Year.D 0.291gb (2.47) 0.0967 (1.05)
Constant 9.2611b (2.49) -1.7466 (-0.39)
0.42 0.68
F statistics 4.42a 12.SSa
t-statistics are in parentheses. a, b and c are statistically significant at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
38TABLE 10 Amount of Reimbursement for the Elderly Care
Cancer Heart related Mental
disease
1999 1991 1989 1991 1999 1991
(yen) (yen) (yen) (yen) (yen) (yen)
Per day 19,62719,919 12,38212.320 9,801 8,831
Per claim 398,298376,562 303,190302,496 254,887254,797
Unit service 2,375 ,330 1,640 1,660 1,729 1,624
Sources: Kokumin Iryohi (National Health andMedicalExpenditures in English),
Department of Statistics and Information, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of
Health and Welfare, 1993; Shakai Iryo Shiryo Koibetsu Chosa Houkoku, Vol.1 and
2, Department of Statistics and Infonnation, Minister's Secretariat, Ministry of
Health and welfare, 1991 and 1993.
39Price of medical
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